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DLD-020        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3171 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  ANDREW J. MURIN, JR., 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to Crim. No. 2:09-cr-00279-002) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
October 26, 2017 
 
Before:  JORDAN, SHWARTZ and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  November 3, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Andrew J. Murin, Jr., a federal prisoner, filed this petition for a writ of mandamus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651, seeking an order directing the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania to rule on his December 15, 2016 post-judgment 
motion, which has been fully briefed since February 7, 2017.  For the following reasons, 
we will deny the petition. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 In 2011, Murin pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting mail fraud in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 1342.  As part of his plea agreement, he agreed to waive his right to 
file a direct appeal, except in limited circumstances, and to file any collateral attack, 
including a motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Murin was 
sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment.  On direct appeal, we granted the Government’s 
motion to enforce the appellate waiver.  See C.A. No. 11-4101.  In 2012, Murin filed a § 
2255 motion, attacking his sentence and conviction.  The District Court enforced the 
waiver and dismissed the motion, and we declined to issue a certificate of appealability.  
See C.A. No. 13-1605.  And in November 2016, we denied Murin’s § 2244 application to 
file a second or successive § 2255 motion.  See C.A. No. 16-3620.  
 On December 15, 2016, Murin filed in the District Court a “Motion for Relief 
Pursuant to Rule 60(b) and Rule 59(e) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” asking that 
his case be remanded for resentencing on the basis of a change in the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines.  That same day, the District Court issued an order directing the 
Government to respond to the motion by January 20, 2017, and allowing Murin to reply 
by February 10, 2017.   The Government filed a timely response, and, on February 7, 
2017, Murin filed a reply.  The motion, however, remains pending in the District Court, 
despite Murin’s subsequent July 7, 2017 motion for a ruling on it.  Murin filed a petition 
for a writ of mandamus in this Court alleging extraordinary delay in the adjudication of 
the motion. 
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 Our jurisdiction derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which grants us the power to 
“issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of [our] . . . jurisdiction[] and agreeable to 
the usages and principles of law.”  A writ of mandamus is an extreme remedy that is 
invoked only in extraordinary situations.  See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 426 U.S. 394, 402 
(1976).  To justify the use of this extraordinary remedy, a petitioner must show both a 
clear and indisputable right to the writ and that he has no other adequate means to obtain 
the relief desired.  See Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992).  “[A]n 
appellate court may issue a writ of mandamus on the ground that undue delay is 
tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction,” Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d 
Cir. 1996), superseded in part on other grounds by 3d Cir. L.A.R. 24.1(c) (1997), but the 
manner in which a court controls its docket is discretionary, see In re Fine Paper Antitrust 
Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982).   
 Murin’s post-judgment motion has been fully briefed and ripe for resolution since 
February 7, 2017.  While the amount of time that it is has been pending is concerning, we 
do not believe, at this time, that the delay is so lengthy as to amount to a failure to 
exercise jurisdiction.  See Madden, 102 F.3d at 79 (holding that the district court’s delay 
of five months was “of concern,” though not yet a denial of due process); see also 
Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that mandamus relief 
was appropriate after a delay of fourteen months due only to docket congestion).  We are 
confident that the District Court will expeditiously rule on the pending motion.  
Furthermore, Murin does not allege that the delay in his case was purposeful or pursuant 
4 
 
to a policy of discrimination.  Cf. Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 319 (9th Cir. 1988).  
Thus, we conclude that there is no basis here for an extraordinary remedy. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.  Our 
denial is, however, without prejudice to Murin’s filing a renewed petition should the 
District Court not rule on his December 15, 2016 post-judgment motion within 90 days of 
our ruling.   
 
 
 
